Confirmation Through Conflict? Some Questions for the Dialogue of Touchstones by Knitter, Paul
CONFIRMATION THROUGH CONFLICT? SOME 
QUESTIONS FOR THE DIALOGUE OF 
TOUCHSTONES 
Paul F. Knitter 
Xavier University 
My first reading of Maurice Friedman's essay produced much the 
same effects that are had—today, alas, so seldom—from a good sermon. I 
was downright inspired and enlivened with new insights and new 
hopes concerning the contemporary encounter of religions. With his 
image of touchstones, Friedman avoids academic annotated analysis 
and provides creative, practical theology. Though he does not indicate it 
through notes or references, he is very well acquainted with the litera-
ture and central issues in the contemporary discussion on "the many 
religions''—how to understand them and how to lead them to a more 
authentic and effective dialogue. 
The particular power of Friedman's proposal is the way it creatively 
and suggestively searches for a middle path between absolutism and 
relativism. He realizes that these two "isms" are pitfalls for both conser-
vative exclusivists and liberal pluraliste. Though certainly of a more 
liberal bent himself, Friedman is well aware that typical "liberal" ap-
peals for greater openness, tolerance, and equality among religions are 
often only steps away from the slippery slopes of indifference and 
relativism. So with guidance from his "touchstones" of truth, he affirms 
both radical pluralism and at the same time radical relatedness. 
And he balances both. On the one hand, he chides pluraliste (like 
me!) and urges them actually to recognize and accept what they are 
advocating—that religious pluralism is real and will not go way, that 
there will always be many, and especially that one can never find the 
ultimate system that will finally and neatly interrelate the many. One 
can never make a "system" out of pluralism (not even a "theocentric" 
system!). As soon as we have discovered—or imposed—a unifying pat-
tern of interrelatedness, we have, actually, destroyed pluralism. And yet, 
on the other hand, Friedman does not fall into the incommensurability 
gap; religions are not so different that they cannot talk to each other. The 
touchstones touch, and must touch, each other. Within the diversity, 
therefore, there is a potential (not given) relatedness—the possibility 
and the necessity of talking to each other. As he puts it, we are "really 
different and yet really together." And for those of us who are concerned 
about losing the uniqueness of our own religion or savior, Friedman tells 
us that we can be both "faithful and diverse"—faithful to our unique-
ness, yet embracing and learning from the uniqueness of others. With 
such images and hopes, the interreligious dialogue can bound forward. 
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Yet as I bounded with him, I felt myself held back by a nagging 
question. If Friedman can help me clarify this question, I will be able to 
follow him all the more enthusiastically. Is his vision of dialogue 
perhaps too irenic or optimistic? This question tugged every time he 
repeated his recurring theme of "a mutually confirming dialogue of 
touchstones." It seems that for Friedman the encounter of religious 
believers will be, if not always at least basically, confirming. Now I 
realize that he does not mean by this a pacific blending of viewpoints. 
Yet in only one paragraph does he explicitly warn against passive ac-
ceptance and tolerance, recognizing that "sometimes the strongest op-
position" is necessary. I suggest that Friedman needs to say more about 
the possibility of a real clash of touchstones, of mutual incompatibilities, 
of possible ruptures in the dialogue. What happens when "in listening to 
the other we" do not "hear something genuine to which we can re-
spond"? What do I do when the dialogue with another believer does not 
"point me toward greater openness"? How does Friedman account for 
such possibilities? 
In order to strengthen and clarify his image of touchstones, I think 
Friedman needs to recognize more explicitly that there can be "touch-
stones of unreality," that religions can provide "detours from reality." 
The history of religions, as well as our contemporary religious scene, 
seems to indicate how religions can become ideologies—means of self-
aggrandizement and manipulation of others. Langdon Gilkey, an ardent 
advocate of interreligious dialogue, has said that in his experience of 
dialogue he has encountered some religious views or touchstones that 
he can describe as nothing else but "intolérable." Friedman, I think, has 
not sufficiently recognized the intolerable in religion; nor has he said 
enough about what we are to do when we encounter the intolerable in 
dialogue. 
A related question: would Friedman recognize situations in which I 
find not that my touchstone of reality is "opened" and "enhanced" 
through the community of otherness but, rather, placed in question—in 
radical question? Might I ever be faced with the possibility or even 
necessity of abandoning my touchstone for another? Indeed, in affirm-
ing my touchstone and in trying to relate it to the past and to others, do I 
not also have to stand ready, at least theoretically or methodologically, to 
abandon it? 
This raises another related and more sticky question: what are the 
criteria by which we can judge whether the dialogue of touchstones is 
mutually contradictory rather than mutually confirming—whether 
another religious touchstone might be intolerable or whether it might be 
calling me to revise or abandon my own? In judging another touchstone 
as intolerable and in taking "strong opposition" to it, am I not imposing 
my touchstone on it? Can Friedman offer us criteria for the truth or 
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validity of touchstones that are more precise and practical than the ones 
he lists at the end of his essay? Or, in making this request, am I falling 
prey to the enticements of "foundationalism" or "objectivism" and 
hankering after a criteriological Archimedian point outside the 
dialogue? 
Perhaps Friedman's response to these questions will be as simple as 
it is engaging: the reason why he finds, or hopes to find, the dialogue of 
touchstones much more confirming than contradictory, the reason why 
he believes that even our "strongest opposition" to another touchstone 
can turn out to be "confirming," is his faith in what he calls "the totally 
nonobjectifiable myth of the Community of Otherness." Friedman has 
accepted—or been possessed by—this myth; it is a matter of faith. Panik-
kar would call it a "cosmic trust" that the incorrigible diversity of 
religious touchstones is ultimately more unitive than divisive, that de-
spite our differences and even contradictions, it is possible and neces-
sary and beneficial to keep on talking and sharing. 
Together with many others, I too share—or want to share—this myth 
of "the Community of Otherness." Friedman has helped me reaffirm it. I 
suggest that his help will be all the more valuable if he would follow the 
suggestions of liberation theologians and show more clearly that and 
how our Community of Otherness can grow not only through mutual 
confirmation but also through mutual confrontation, even conflict. 
